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THE STATUS OF TREATIES IN UNITED STATES LAW-
REEXAMINING THE "LAST IN TIME RULE" IN LIGHT
OF UNITED STATES v. PALESTINE
LIBERATION ORGANIZATION*
In his inaugural address, President George Bush declared that
"[g]reat nations like great men must keep their word. When America
says something, America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a
vow made on marble steps." ' Contrary to the President's statement,
United States law recognizes that Congress may violate a treaty by pass-
ing a statute subsequent to the treaty, even against the will of the Presi-
dent.2 The Supreme Court developed this doctrine, known as the "last
in time rule," over 100 years ago. The recent attempt by.Congress to
close the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") Observer Mission
to the United Nations demonstrates the questionable viability of the last
in time rule.
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 1987, Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act 3
("ATA") as a rider amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act of 1988-89. 4 The ATA's primary purpose was to terminate all PLO
operations in the United States.5 The ATA was passed despite opposi-
tion from both the State Department and the United Nations, both of
whom opposed the bill on the grounds that it threatened the PLO Ob-
server Mission to the United Nations. 6 The Secretary-General of the
United Nations and the United States Secretary of State expressed con-
cern that by mandating closure of the PLO Mission, the ATA jeopard-
ized the independent functioning of the United Nations, 7 as provided in
* The author wishes to thank Donald W. Dowd, Professor of Law, Villanova
University School of Law, Keith Highet, Adjunct Professor of International Law,
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and especially
John F. Murphy, Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law, for their
help in conceptualizing and developing many of the ideas in this Note.
1. Inaugural Address, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 101 (Jan. 20, 1989).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 115(l)(a) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; see also L. HEN-
KIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 163-64 (1972).
3. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (Supp. V 1987).
4. Pub. L. No. 100-204, §§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406-07 (1987)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (Supp. V 1987)).
5. United States v. Palestine Liberation Org. (U.S. v. PLO), 695 F. Supp.
1456, 1459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Palmieri,J., authored the opinion for the court).
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the Headquarters Agreement of 1947,8 the international agreement
which establishes the right of the United Nations to be headquartered in
the United States. Despite numerous contrary statements from State
Department officials, Congress insisted that the ATA would not violate
the Headquarters Agreement. 9
In March 1988, the Justice Department attempted to enforce the
ATA by ordering the PLO to close its United Nations Observer Mis-
sion.10 When the PLO refused this order, the Justice Department
sought injunctive relief in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York.' 1
In United States v. Palestine Liberation Organization (U.S. v. PLO),'12 the
court avoided a direct analysis of the issue of the status of treaties in
United States law by falling back on a principle which is traditionally
invoked to ameliorate the harshness of the last in time rule. This princi-
ple, first expounded by Chief Justice Marshall in Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, I3 states that "an act of Congress ought never to be con-
strued to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction
remains."' 14 In U.S. v. PLO, the court determined that the ATA did not
apply to the PLO Observer Mission and thus did not violate the United
States' obligations under the Headquarters Agreement.' 5 Although the
court did not base its decision on the last in time rule, the rule was sub-
merged just beneath the surface of the opinion. 16 The court was obvi-
ously reluctant to hold that Congress had overruled a treaty obligation
between the United Nations and the United States.' 7 Other courts have
been equally reluctant to directly invoke the last in time rule. 18 This
8. Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations Regard-
ing the Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, United States-
United Nations, 61 Stat. 3416, T.I.A.S. No. 1676 [hereinafter Headquarters
Agreement].
9. See U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1469-70.
10. Id. at 1460.
11. Id. In Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), the
PLO countersued, alleging that the Justice Department's conduct violated a
number of constitutional rights of its members. The PLO's constitutional claims
were rejected. Id. at 1479-90.
12. 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
13. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
14. Id. at 118.
15. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468-71.
16. Id. at 1464-65. The court affirmed the last in time rule in dictum. Id.
17. Id. at 1469-71.
18. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fish-
ing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 ("Absent explicit statutory language, we
have been extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights
.... .), modified, 444 U.S. 816 (1979); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391
U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968) (power to abrogate treaty rights exists, but intention to
abrogate should not be imputed lightly); Diggs v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 465-66
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (court alluded to last in time rule without citing any authority),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
1266 [Vol. 34: p. 1265
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reluctance indicates that the last in time rule may no longer be a viable
principle of United States law. At the very least, an in-depth examina-
tion of the desirability and constitutionality of the last in time rule is in
order.
This Note examines the origins of the last in time rule' 9 and dem-
onstrates that the rule is inconsistent with the principle of international
cooperation, particularly as manifested by the creation of multilateral
treaties, such as the United Nations Charter.2 0 This Note focuses on the
recent PLO controversy as evidence that strict adherence to the last in
time rule jeopardizes the viability of the United Nations. 2 1 Further-
more, this Note demonstrates that the last in time rule is unsound as a
matter of constitutional law. 22 It concludes that if the power to violate
treaties is vested anywhere in the United States government, it is vested
in the executive branch, which alone is constitutionally authorized to
control diplomatic relations.23
II. ORIGIN OF THE LAST IN TIME RULE
The last in time rule was developed in the latter part of the nine-
teenth century out of the need to resolve conflicts between bilateral
commercial treaties and federal statutes. 24 Then, as now, nationalism,
absolute sovereignty and legislative supremacy were prevailing political
themes in America. 25 The notion of greater international cooperation
through multilateral treaties, however, had not yet been developid. 2 6
The last in time rule was firmly embraced by the United States
Supreme Court in three cases decided during the 1880s: Edye v. Robert-
son (Head Money Cases), 2 7 Whitney v. Robertson28 and Chae Chan Ping v.
United States (Chinese Exclusion Case).29 The Court derived the rule from
the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, which states that
the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
19. For a discussion of the origins of the last in time rule, see infra notes 24-
39 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the effect of the last in time rule on multilateral
treaties, see infra notes 40-88 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the PLO controversy, see infra notes 89-147 and
accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the constitutional implications of the last in time
rule, see infra notes 148-225 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the last in time rule as encroaching on executive
authority, see infra notes 197-225 and accompanying text.
24. See Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy
and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1103-04, 1110-14 (1985) (analyzing
conflicts between United States law and international law).
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
28. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
29. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land."'30 The Court stated that because the supremacy
clause gave federal statutes and treaties lexical equality, any conflict be-
tween a treaty and a statute should be resolved in favor of the latter
enactment.
3 1
Each of these precedent cases involved disputes over bilateral com-
mercial treaties. The Head Money Cases developed after Congress en-
acted legislation which, in an effort "to regulate immigration,
' 32
imposed a tax of fifty cents per foreign passenger upon the owners of
ships who brought passengers from a foreign port to a United States
port.33 The plaintiffs argued that the act violated a number of bilateral
treaties which had established rules of commerce between the United
States and other nations. 34 The Supreme Court upheld the act as a
proper use of Congress' legislative authority and stated that nothing in
the essential character of treaties gave them superior sanctity over
statutes.
3 5
In Whitney, the plaintiffs were merchants who argued that a congres-
sional act which imposed a tax on imported sugar should not supercede
a prior commercial treaty between the United States and the Dominican
Republic. 36 The Court upheld the act and explicitly recognized the last
in time rule by stating that its duty was "to construe and give effect to
the latest expression of the sovereign will."' 3 7 In the Chinese Exclusion
Case, the Court upheld a statute which regulated the immigration of Chi-
nese laborers and abrogated immigration provisions of previous treaties
between the United States and China.38 The Court reaffirmed the last
30. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
31. Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 600; Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194-95.
32. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 595.
33. Id. at 581.
34. Id. at 597. The Supreme Court doubted whether the act violated any
treaties or provisions, but did not end its inquiry there. Id. The Court reasoned
that even if provisions of the act conflicted with an existing treaty, the provisions
of the act would prevail because a treaty "is subject to such acts as Congress may
pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal." Id. at 597-99.
35. Id. at 599-600. The Court stated that the tax was within the power of
Congress to regulate foreign commerce. Id. at 596, 600.
36. Whitney, 124 U.S. at 191-92. The United States had ratified a treaty with
the Hawaiian Islands providing duty-free importation into the United States for
a number of articles. Id. at 191. The plaintiffs argued that a treaty between the
Dominican Republic and the United States, which provided that any item im-
ported from the Dominican Republic would not be taxed higher than items im-
ported from any other foreign country, did not permit the United States to levy a
tax on sugar imported from the Dominican Republic because sugars similar in
kind produced in Hawaii were admitted to the United States duty-free. Id. at
191-92.
37. Id. at 195.
38. Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 600-11. This case was also a landmark case
in support of the proposition that Congress could regulate immigration into the
[Vol. 34: p. 12651268
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in time rule, declaring that "the last expression of the sovereign will
must control."
3 9
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A COOPERATIVE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER
In recent years, the Supreme Court has cited or alluded to the last
in time rule for the proposition that a statute can overrule a previously
enacted treaty. 40 Not since the 1880s, however, has the Supreme Court
reexamined the merits of the rule. Therefore, it is appropriate to ex-
amine the last in time rule in the light of modern political and legal
developments. When the last in time rule was developed, the Supreme
Court did not have the opportunity to consider the impact it would have
on a cooperative international legal order. Since the latter part of the
nineteenth century, however, both customary international law and
treaty law have developed extensively. A common movement in both
customary and treaty law is the shift towards greater cooperation and
shared responsibility among nations.
The modern notions of erga omnes andjus cogens demonstrate inter-
national cooperation regarding customary international law. Erga omnes
is an evolving doctrine which establishes the principle that a nation's
conduct may be so egregious and detrimental to the international com-
munity that all nations, not just those directly involved, have a right to
respond.4 ' Erga omnes emerged as a result of multilateral agreements on
basic human rights, such as the outlawing of genocide and acts of
aggression. 42
The establishment ofjus cogens norms of customary international law
takes erga omnes one step further. Jus cogens norms are customary interna-
tional law norms which have achieved such overwhelming international
United States. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty. A Century
of Chinese Exclusion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 858-59 (1987). Professor Henkin
argues that while the last in time rule has a weak foundation, there is little need
for concern because Congress seldom violates treaties. Id. at 872.
39. Chinese Exclusion, 130 U.S. at 600.
40. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986); Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Washington
State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690, modified,
444 U.S. 816 (1979); Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13
(1968).
41. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 902 reporters' note 1 (1987) (cit-
ing Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd., 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32). "Some universal and some regional human rights conventions al-
low any party to the convention to bring before an international commission or
court any breach of the convention by another party, provided both parties have
accepted an optional clause on the subject." Id.
42. See, e.g., Annual Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, arts. 11, 22, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, 660 U.N.T.S. 195
(1965); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, arts. 24, 48(c), 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950).
1989] NOTE 1269
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consensus that they are considered binding and absolute. 43 Jus cogens
norms include a number of human rights principles which are consid-
ered superior to principles of sovereignty. 44 The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties4 5 states that these peremptory norms must be "ac-
cepted and recognized by the international community of states as a
whole." 46
The development of a cooperative international community
through codified law is best evidenced by the creation of multilateral
treaties which in turn form international organizations. 4 7 A revolution-
ary element of some of these organizations is that they are suprana-
tional. That is, they have the power to assert actual direct legislative
authority over their members and may directly bind national enterprises
without interference from member states' national governments. Thus,
international organizations which impose supranational obligations re-
quire their member states to defer to treaty obligations or organizational
legislative decisions even if they conflict with the member states' domes-
43. See Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to Interna-
tional Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 589 (Spring 1988) (These powerful norms
"then form part of the general categoryjus cogens: a symbol for unwritten consti-
tutional guidance to the positive law-making power of sovereign nation-states
reflecting those interests most basic to international society.").
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 702 reporters' note 11. Sec-
tion 702 reads:
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it
practices, encourages, or condones
(a) genocide,(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(0 systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human rights.
Id. But see Remarks by R. Lillich, Proceedings of the 79th Annual Meeting, Apr.
25-27, 1985, Proceedings, Am. Soc. Int'l L., at 84 (questioning whether all
norms stated in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 arejus cogens norms) (cited in Chris-
tenson, supra note 43, at 617 n.134); Schachter, International Law in Theory and
Practice, 178 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 340 (1982) (stating that no official organiza-
tion has elevated human rights to the level ofjus cogens) (cited in Christenson,
supra note 43, at 617 n.134).
45. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The Vienna Convention is
designed to govern all treaties. See Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 281, 285 (Winter 1988).
The United States, although a signatory, is not a party to the treaty, but many of
its provisions codify customary norms to which the United States adheres. Id. at
286.
46. Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 53, at 344.
47. SeeJ. Murphy, Remarks at the Meeting of the American Society of Inter-
national Law Regarding the PLO Mission 1-2 (Draft Panel Report 39) (Aug. 8,
1988) (available in Villanova University School of Law Library).
1270 [Vol. 34: p. 1265
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 6 [1989], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/7
tic laws. 48 These multilateral treaties establish new legal systems which,
if allowed to function properly, exert control over the conduct of the
member states. 4 9 In order for these multilateral organizations to remain
viable, however, member states must adhere to their obligations.
The Supreme Court of the 1880s could not have anticipated the
possibility of the destruction of an entire international legal system by a
nation violating its treaty obligations. Thus, the declaration in the Head
Money Cases that a treaty does not have "superior sanctity" over a stat-
ute50 should be construed narrowly to apply, if at all, only to bilateral
commercial treaties, such as the treaties at issue in the Head Money Cases,
Whitney and the Chinese Exclusion Case.5 1 This is because the pronounce-
ment did not take into account the importance of multilateral regimes
created by treaties such as the United Nations Charter, to which the
United States is a party, and the Rome Treaty, 52 which established the
European Economic Community ("EEC").
The United Nations Charter has emerged as a paradigmatic multi-
lateral treaty. It imposes international obligations because the nations
that signed the Charter expressly agreed to be bound by its rules and
principles. 53 The Charter laid the framework for the creation and devel-
opment of global cooperation, world peace and prosperity. While the
United Nations, unlike the EEC, was not designed primarily as a supra-
national organization, its internal structure imposes some supranational
obligations on its members.
In the United Nations, all member states vote in General Assembly
Resolutions. 54 These resolutions establish an international consensus
and occasionally a norm of customary international law, but are not con-
sidered legally binding on member states. 5 5
48. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND
INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPECTIVE: TEXT, CASES AND READINGS 20-21 (1967) (citing
Robertson, Legal Problems of European Integration, 91 RECUEIL DES COURS 105, 143-
48 (1957)).
49. W.P. GORMLEY, THE PROCEDURAL STATUS OF THE INDIVIDUAL BEFORE IN-
TERNATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL TRIBUNALS 127 (1966). The purpose of multi-
lateral treaties is "the protection of all subjects of international law and not
merely sovereign nations." Id.
50. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599.
51. For a discussion of these cases, see supra notes 27-39 and accompanying
text.
52. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter Rome Treaty].
53. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
54. Id. art. 18.
55. See Note, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolutions in Determin-
ing Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876, 879-
80. This article explains how General Assembly resolutions have developed
from mere advisory opinions to possible sources of international law. Id. at 884-
92 (citing Filartiga v. Penal-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (court
implied that it considered General Assembly resolutions "to be authoritative
1989] NOTE 1271
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The more authoritative legal source within the United Nations is the
Security Council, which is entrusted with imposing supranational obliga-
tions on member states. 56 The power to impose binding authority is
conferred by articles 24 and 25 of the United Nations Charter.5 7 Article
24 states that the member states entrust the Security Council with re-
sponsibility for the "maintenance of international peace and security."15 8
Article 25 expressly provides: "The Members of the United Nations
agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in
accordance with the present Charter." 59
The binding authority of Security Council Resolutions is not abso-
lute. 60 Articles 24 and 25 must be examined in context with the particu-
lar language of a resolution. 6 1 By its terms, a resolution only may be
recommended to all member states.6 2 However, if the language of a
resolution unambiguously imposes obligations on member states, they
are bound to comply with the Security Council decision.6 3
The Security Council consists of eleven members, including five
permanent members: the United States, the People's Republic of China,
France, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. 6 4 An affirmative vote of the Security Council affects
all members of the United Nations, provided no permanent member of
the Security Council vetoes the resolution. 6 5 The concentration of
power in the five permanent members (so-called "Great Powers") re-
sulted from their worldwide strength following the Second World
War.66 The victors wanted to establish an international organization for
the purpose of preventing future war.6 7 In order to be effective, it was
sources of international law" and stated that United Nations Charter along with
various General Assembly resolutions guarantee right to be free from torture)).
56. Note, Federal Courts Lack Subject Matter Jurisdiction to Adjudicate Claims Aris-
ing Out of United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 24 U. KAN. L. REV. 395, 398
(1976). The principal advantage of the United Nations over the ineffectual
League of Nations is the ability of the Security Council to assert binding author-
ity. Id. (citing Eagleton, The United Nations: Aims and Structure, 55 YALE L.J. 974,
989 (1946)).
57. See Note, supra note 56, at 398.
58. U.N. CHARTER art. 24.
59. Id. art. 25.
60. See Note, supra note 56, at 398.
61. Id. at 399.
62. Id. at 398 (citing H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONs 293
(1966)).
63. Id. at 398-99 n.28 (citing Higgins, The Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Which
U.N. Resolutions Are Binding Under Article 25 of the Charter?, 21.INT'L & COMP. L.Q
270 (1972)).
64. U.N. CHARTER art. 23, para. 1.
65. Id. art. 27, para. 3.
66. Eagleton, The United Nations: Aims and Structure, 55 YALE L.J. 974, 975
(1946).
67. Id. The goal of the Great Powers, however, was primarily to prevent
their World War II enemies from again becoming belligerent. Id. The Great
1272 [Vol. 34: p. 1265
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necessary for the organization to have binding authority. None of the
Great Powers, however, was willing to have the United Nation's author-
ity supersede its national sovereignty. 68 The structure of the Security
Council, therefore, represents a balance between the need to impose
binding supranational obligations on member states, and a reluctance to
discard cherished principles of national sovereignty. 6 9
A strict interpretation of the last in time rule is inconsistent with the
recognition of international obligations. When Congress passes laws in-
consistent with United States international obligations, these interna-
tional obligations do not disappear; the issue becomes whether and how
the United States will remedy the breach. 70 But a United States viola-
tion of a supranational obligation may be so damaging to the interna-
tional community, particularly to a multilateral organization such as the
United Nations, that it may effectively be remediless. For example, if the
United States refused to honor its supranational obligations to the
United Nations, other nations would be unable to rely fully on the
United Nations' binding authority. Thus, the United States could poten-
tially cripple the United Nations by passing superseding legislation.
An example of such a dangerous application of the last in time rule
was the United States' noncompliance with the trade embargo of South-
ern Rhodesia. In 1966 the United Nations Security Council, with an af-
firmative vote from the United States, adopted Resolution 232, which
imposed a trade embargo on Southern Rhodesia. 7 1 In 1971 Congress
adopted the Byrd Amendment which unilaterally lifted the embargo.72
In Diggs v. Shultz, 7 3 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia rejected a claim for injunctive relief by Rhodesian nationals
and others, including some prominent Americans. The Rhodesians
claimed that the issuance of a license to Union Carbide Corp., which
authorized importation of goods from Southern Rhodesia, violated the
1966 Security Council Resolution and was not authorized by the Byrd
Amendment.7" The court held that the issuance of the license was au-
thorized by the Byrd Amendment. 75 The court also held, without citing
Powers did not adequately consider "the probability of disagreement and there-
fore of deadlock among those who must agree." Id. at 976.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 115(l)(b).
71. S.C. Res. 232, 21 U.N. SCOR (1239th mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc. S/232
(1966).
72. Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, Pub. L. No. 92-156,
title V, 85 Stat. 427 (1972) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 98 to 98h-4 (1982)).
73. 470 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973).
74. Id. at 463-64. The nationals asserted that it was not Congress' intention
in the Byrd Amendment to lift the trade embargo. Id. at 465.
75. Id. at 466. The court also dismissed the notion that Congress did not
intend to compel the President to lift the sanctions. Id. The court reasoned that
the only possible construction of the Byrd Amendment was that it was intended
to directly violate the United States' international agreement. Id. at 465-66.
1989] NOTE 1273
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any authority, that Congress was entitled to pass laws denouncing trea-
ties if it so desired. 7 6
The recent attempt by Congress to close the PLO Observer Mis-
sion, and thereby violate the Headquarters Agreement, posed a much
greater threat to the United Nations than the Byrd Amendment. 77 The
purpose of the Headquarters Agreement, which came into effect soon
after the United Nations Charter, was to guarantee the United Nations'
independence and authority over all of its activities, and particularly to
protect those activities from intrusion by the host government, the
United States. 78 The agreement expressly states that the United States
will allow the United Nations "fully and efficiently to discharge its re-
sponsibilities and fulfill its purposes." 79
One aspect of the Headquarters Agreement that was overlooked by
the court in U.S. v. PLO is that the agreement is technically not a treaty,
but a congressional-executive agreement where, by joint resolution, the
Senate and the House of Representatives authorized the President to
bring the agreement into effect. 80 The Headquarters Agreement should
not be viewed standing alone, however, for it is inextricably intertwined
with the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the Headquarters Agreement
refers exclusively to the United States' obligations to the United Na-
tions. 8 ' Thus, a threat to the Headquarters Agreement is a threat to the
operations of the United Nations.
If the court in U.S. v. PLO had invoked the last in time rule and
allowed the United StatesJustice Department to close the PLO Observer
Mission in violation of the Headquarters Agreement, the viability of the
United Nations would have been at risk. In addition to jeopardizing the
essential and independent nature of the United Nations' operations, a
violation of the Headquarters Agreement would have forced the mem-
ber states to question the ability and willingness of the United States to
honor its international obligations.
The emergence of multilateral treaties with supranational obliga-
tions has been a significant step in creating a more peaceful, interdepen-
dent world. Many nations have officially recognized that treaties take
76. Id. at 466.
77. For an in-depth discussion of the PLO Observer Mission controversy,
see infra notes 89-147 and accompanying text.
78. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 8, art. I, 61 Stat. at 3417.
79. Id. art. IX, § 27, 61 Stat. at 3434.
80. J. Res. 357, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1953). See also L. HENKIN, supra note
2, at 175. Professor Henkin states that congressional-executive agreements are
mechanisms whereby "the President can seek approval by joint resolution of
both houses of Congress instead of two-thirds of the Senate only." Id.
81. Highet, The Irresistable Force and the Immovable Object: Reflections on the Re-
cent PLO Controversies, 29 VA. J. INT'L L. 859, 860-61 (1989). The author notes
that the Headquarters Agreement was vital because "it governs the location and
operation of [the United Nations'] headquarters and the performance of its func-
tions." Id. at 861.
1274 [Vol. 34: p. 1265
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precedence over domestic laws. 82 For instance, France, 83 Greece 84 and
the Netherlands8 5 have constitutions which expressly give treaties
supremacy over even later enacted statutes.
The paradigmatic example of a supranational organization is the
EEC, which was established by the Rome Treaty. The founding nations
gave the EEC broad power in order to ensure economic and social pros-
perity.8 6 The notion of supranationality in the EEC derives primarily
from Article 189 of the Rome Treaty, which unambiguously provides
that regulations adopted by the Council and the Commission, the two
governing bodies of the EEC, "shall be binding in every respect and
directly applicable in each Member State."
8 7
Although it is not a member, the United States should not be blind
to the successes and growth of the EEC. Indeed, given the trend toward
greater global cooperation, it is entirely possible that the United States
will want to achieve greater international cooperation in economic, envi-
ronmental, technological and social affairs. Moreover, it is not incon-
ceivable that in the near future the United States will seek admission
into an expanded EEC or some other emerging international organiza-
tion which features supranationality as an integral element. But if the
United States rigidly adheres to the last in time rule, it will be hampered
in its efforts to enter into such international agreements because other
nations will be unable to rely on the United States' compliance with su-
pranational obligations.
The Belgian Cour de Cassation in a 1971 judgment, referring to the
operation of the Common Market, convincingly articulated the need for
treaty supremacy in today's international community. "The reason is
that the treaties which have created Community law have instituted a
new legal system in whose favour the member states have restricted the
exercise of their sovereign powers in the areas determined by those
82. See, e.g., J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 27 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter LEGAL SYSTEM]
("The Federal Tribunal of Switzerland holds that an international agreement
prevails over subsequent and inconsistent domestic law.") (citation omitted).
83. FRANCE CONST. art. 55. See also Judgment of 1975, Cour de Cassation
(Chambres r6unies), France, 16 Common Mkt. L.R. 336 (1975), reprinted in part
in LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 82, at 20, 22-23 ("[I]t is clear that the international
legal order can only be realised and developed if the states loyally apply the
treaties they have signed, ratified and published.") (submissions of Procureur
General M. Adolphe Touffait).
84. CONST. DE LA GRECE art. 28(1).
85. STATUUT NED. art. 66.
86. Rome Treaty, supra note 52, preamble, at 14. The original members
were Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Id. at 11 n.l.
87. Id. art. 189. Article 189 also provides that directives may be adopted by
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treaties." 88
IV. THE PLO CONTROVERSY
A. Background
The Supreme Court has never reexamined the merits of the last in
time rule, in large measure because Congress has been careful to respect
the sanctity of international law and the diplomatic channels of the exec-
utive branch. 89 That respect, however, was egregiously absent in the
recent controversy over the PLO Observer Mission to the United
Nations.
Since 1974, at the invitation of the United Nations, the PLO has
maintained an observer mission to the United Nations in New York
City.90 The invitation was met with initial congressional resistance, but
in Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'ith v. Kissinger91 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York held that PLO repre-
sentatives, under the terms of the Headquarters Agreement, were enti-
tled to access to Manhattan in order to enhance the peacekeeping efforts
of the United Nations.
The PLO maintained its mission without any further governmental
opposition until July 1986, when members of Congress asked the United
States Department of State to close the PLO offices in the United States
because of an alleged increase in terrorism by the PLO. 92 The Secretary
of State refused to close the PLO offices because of the United States'
international obligations under the Headquarters Agreements. 9 3
In May 1987, after the State Department refused to close the PLO
88. See Judgment of 1975, Cour de Cassation (Chambres r~unies), France,
16 Common Mkt. L.R. 336 (1975), reprinted in part in LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note
82, at 20, 25 (submissions of Procureur General M. Adolphe Trouffait) (quoting
Judgment of May 27, 1971, Belgian Cour de Cassation).
89. See Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chi-
nese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 872 (1987). Professor Hen-
kin asserts that although the last in time rule does not have a strong foundation,
there is little need for concern because Congress rarely disregards treaty obliga-,
tions. Id.
90. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1459 (citing G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) (Agenda Item 108) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974)). Ob-
server Missions do not have a vote in the United Nations but are present to
observe the U.S. proceedings. Id. at 1458.
91. No. 74 C. 1545, slip op. (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1974).
92. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1459-60 (citations omitted). In Palestine
Information Office v. Shultz, 674 F. Supp. 910, 916-18 (D.D.C. 1987), the court
held that the State Department could close the Palestine Information Office in
Washington, D.C. pursuant to the broad executive authority of the Foreign Mis-
sions Act.
93. See 133 CONG. REC. E1635-36 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987) (letter from
George P. Shultz to Jack Kemp, dated Jan. 13, 1987) ("[W]e ... are under an
obligation to permit PLO Observer Mission personnel to enter and remain in
the United States to carry out their official functions at UN headquarters.").
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offices, the ATA was introduced in the Senate. 94 The ATA declares it
unlawful
notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to estab-
lish or maintain an office, headquarters, premises, or other fa-
cilities or establishments within the jurisdiction of the United
States at the behest or direction of, or with funds provided by
the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent
groups, any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof.9 5
Soon after the ATA's introduction, the Secretary-General of the
United Nations expressed his view that if the ATA were to become law
and the United States were to close the PLO Observer Mission, the
United States would be in violation of sections 11, 12, and 13 of the
Headquarters Agreement, which gave United Nations members and in-
vitees freedom of transit to the United Nations. 96 In addition, the State
Department opposed the ATA on the grounds that it violated U.S. inter-
national obligations. 9 7
Despite the possible international ramifications and opposition by
the State Department, the ATA was passed without any committee hear-
ings and with minimal congressional debate.98 The admonitions of sev-
eral Senators that the nuances of the ATA be explored carefully went
unheeded. 9 9 The ATA was passed as a rider amendment to the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988-89 on December 16,
1987.100 Six days later President Reagan signed the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act into law. When President Reagan signed the bill he
expressed his concern that it encroached upon the Executive's power to
94. 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (Supp. V 1987), introduced in 133 CONG. REC.
E1635 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1987).
95. Id. § 5202(3).
96. Article IV, § 11 of the Headquarters Agreement provides in pertinent
part: "[T]he United States shall not impose any impediments to transit to or
from the headquarters district of ... (5) other persons invited to the headquar-
ters district by the United Nations or by such specialized agency on official busi-
ness." Headquarters Agreement, supra note 8, art. IV, § 11. Section 12
provides: "The provisions of Section 11 shall be applicable irrespective of the
relations existing between the Governments of the persons referred to in that
section and the Government of the United States." Id. art. IV, § 12. Section 13
provides in pertinent part: "Laws and regulations in force in the United States
regarding the entry of aliens shall not be applied in such manner as to interfere
with the privileges referred to in Section 11." Id. art. IV, § 13.
97. See Remarks of Hon. Abraham Sofaer: "It is our judgment that the
Headquarters Agreement as interpreted and applied would be violated."
Sciolino, State Dept. Adviser Says Shutting PLO Mission Would Break Law, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 13, 1988, at A3, col. 2.
98. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1460.
99. Id. at 1460 n.13 (citations omitted).
100. Title X of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988-89, Pub. L.
No. 100-204, §§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406-07 (1987) (codified at 22
U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (Supp. V 1987)).
1989] NOTE 1277
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conduct foreign affairs.' 0 1 President Reagan insisted, however, that the
ATA did not violate any international obligations because the United
States continued to refuse to recognize the PLO as a sovereign.' 0 2
After the passage of the ATA, and despite strong admonitions from
the State Department, the Justice Department stated that it intended to
apply the ATA to the PLO Observer Mission in New York. 10 3 The Jus-
tice Department disregarded a United Nations Resolution calling for the
United States to continue to allow the PLO access to the United Na-
tions.10 4 Instead, the Justice Department focused on the enforcement
provision of the ATA. 0 5
The controversy also raised a serious question as to whether the
United States was obligated to submit to arbitration under section 21 of
the Headquarters Agreement, which provides for arbitration in the'
event of a dispute between the United States and the United Nations.' 0 6
The Justice Department insisted that there was no dispute because the
matter was still pending before a United States court. 10 7 The General
Assembly of the United Nations, however, submitted the matter to the
International Court of justice, which issued a unanimous advisory opin-
ion maintaining that a dispute existed and that the United States was
bound by international law to comply with section 21.108
101. President's Statement on Signing H.R. 1777 Into Law, 23 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1548 (Dec. 22, 1987).
102. Id.
103. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the
United Nations Headquarters Agreement of 26June 1947, 1988 LCJ. 13 (Advi-
sory Opinion) (Apr. 26, 1988). The Attorney General wrote to the PLO Ob-
server Mission and stated that the United States, because of the last in time rule,
could force the closure of the mission "irrespective of international law." Id.
104. G.A. Res. 229A, 42 U.N. GAOR (104th plen. mtg.) at 1, U.N. Doc.
A/42/229 (1987) (affirming that United States is bound to not interfere with
PLO Mission).
105. 22 U.S.C. § 5203(a) (Supp. V 1987). This section states: "The Attor-
ney General shall take the necessary steps and institute the necessary legal ac-
tion to effectuate the policies and provisions of this chapter." Id.
106. Article VIII, § 21 of the Headquarters Agreement provides:
Any dispute between the United Nations and the United States con-
cerning the interpretation or application of this agreement ... which is
not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement, shall be
referred for final decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators, one to be
named by the Secretary-General, one to be named by the Secretary of
State of the United States, and the third to be chosen by the two, or, if
they shall fail to agree upon a third, then by the President of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
Headquarters Agreement, supra note 8, art. VIII, § 21.
107. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Na-
tions Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. at 14.
108. Id.
1278 [Vol. 34: p. 1265
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 6 [1989], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol34/iss6/7
B. Judicial Resolution of the PLO Controversy
When the PLO refused to comply with the order of the Attorney
General to close its United Nations Mission, the United States sought
injunctive relief.'0 9 The PLO and its supporters responded with a coun-
tersuit alleging that the ATA was unconstitutional." 0
Two critical issues in U.S. v. PLO were: (1) whether the United
States was bound to submit the dispute to international arbitration ac-
cording to the terms of the Headquarters Agreement, and (2) whether
the ATA mandated the closure of the PLO Observer Mission. The court
did not address the merits of the first issue, holding that it was a political
question not within the power of the judiciary, but rather under the con-
trol of the political branches of the government. I I Since the executive
branch had decided not to submit the matter to arbitration, the court
ruled that the judiciary was precluded from ordering it to do so. 1 12
The court analyzed the second issue as presenting two potential
questions. The first question was whether the ATA was applicable to
the PLO Observer Mission. If it were applicable, the next question
would be whether the last in time rule should be invoked to give effect to
the ATA over the provisions of the Headquarters Agreement granting
access to the PLO." 3 The court affirmed the last in time rule in dic-
tum, 114 but avoided a direct consideration of this question by ruling that
the ATA did not apply to the PLO Observer Mission.' 15
The court based its decision on the principle of statutory construc-
tion that a statute should not be read to violate international law if there
is another possible interpretation.' 16 The court therefore determined
that it was not the clear intention of Congress to have the ATA apply to
the PLO Observer Mission.'" 7 This determination was based on an
analysis of the explicit language and legislative history of the Act.' 18
109. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1460.
110. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). Judge Pal-
mieri rejected the plaintiff's claims. Id. at 1479-90.
111. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1462 (area of international policy one in
which courts should refrain from participating) (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211-13 (1962)).
112. Id. at 1463; cf Lobel, supra note 24, at 1159 ("Courts often use the
political question doctrine to avoid deciding difficult or politically controversial
cases. This indiscriminate invocation of the doctrine represents an abandon-
ment of principle insofar as it suggests that the political branches are subject to
no legal imitations.") (footnote omitted).
113. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1464.
114. Id. at 1465.
115. Id. at 1464-71.
116. Id. (citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)
64 (1804)).
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C. Explicit Language of the A TA
The government argued that by its plain terms the ATA was in-
tended to close the PLO Observer Mission. 119 The ATA expressly
makes it unlawful
if the purpose be to further the interests of the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization ... (3) notwithstanding any provision of law
to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquarters,
premises, or other facilities or establishments within the juris-
diction of the United States at the behest or direction of ... the
Palestine Liberation Organization.12 0
The government contended that the qualifying language of section 3,
"notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary," renounced any
prior United States obligations, including treaties. 12 1 The government
therefore asked the court for a "literal application of the maxim that in
the event of conflict between two laws, the one of later date will
prevail." 122
The court gave two reasons for holding that the plain language of
the ATA was insufficient by itself to demonstrate a clear congressional
intent to violate a treaty provision. First, the PLO Observer Mission it-
self was not mentioned in the Act.12 3 Second, there was no mention of
any congressional intent to violate the Headquarters Agreement.' 24 In
the absence of either provision, the court held that the clause "notwith-
standing any provision of law to the contrary" did not establish that
Congress intended to violate the Headquarters Agreement by closing
the PLO Observer Mission.12 5
D. Legislative History of the A TA
The court further held that the legislative history of the ATA did
not indicate that the ATA was applicable to the PLO Observer Mis-
sion. 126 The court's primary reason for this determination was that
Congress had not evinced an intent to close the PLO Observer Mission
in violation of the Headquarters Agreement. 12 7 All the members of
Congress who spoke in favor of the ATA insisted, in spite of contrary
interpretations by the Secretary of State and other members of the State
119. Id. at 1469.
120. 22 U.S.C. § 5202 (Supp. V 1987).




125. Id.; see also Amicus Curiae Memoranda of Law and Appendices Submit-
ted By and on Behalf of the United Nations at 8-9, U.S. v. PLO (No. 88 Civ.-
1962).
126. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1468-71.
127. Id. at 1469.
1280 [Vol. 34: p. 1265
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Department, that the bill did not violate United States obligations under
the Headquarters Agreement. 128
The court noted that the debate on the merits of the bill was divided
and inconsistent, and there did not appear to be a clear congressional
understanding of the legal issues involved. 129 The admonitions of sev-
eral senators that the issues needed to be more carefully explored were
ignored. 130 Some Senators misunderstood the treaty obligations, and
others desired to make only political statements; but not one member of
Congress contended that the ATA would violate United States interna-
tional obligations. ' 3 1
The court decided that the enforcement of the ATA against the
PLO Observer Mission would clearly constitute a violation of the Head-
quarters Agreement. The court held that although the Headquarters
Agreement does not expressly grant observer missions access to the
United Nations, the United States still has an obligation to provide ac-
cess to the PLO Observer Mission.13 2
In ruling that the United States was bound by the Headquarters
Agreement to provide access to the PLO, the court relied on section 11
of the Headquarters Agreement, which provides that "the United States
shall not impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters
district of ... representatives of Members ... [or] other persons invited
to the headquarters district by the United Nations . . .on official busi-
ness." 133 The court also relied on section 13, which provides that the
United States cannot interfere with the residence of invitees of the
United Nations. 134 The court determined that the purpose of the Head-
quarters Agreement was to prevent the United States from exerting in-
fluence over the United Nations' activities, including the United Nations'
right to maintain observer missions. 135
Moreover, the court considered the established practice of the
United States' noninterference with United Nations Observer Missions
in New York. The United States had never once in forty years objected
to a United Nations Observer Mission. 136 Furthermore, the United
States had allowed PLO access to the United Nations in New York since
1974.'37 The court determined that the United States' acquiescence in
allowing the PLO and all other observer missions to maintain their mis-
sions without interference indicated that the United States recognized
128. Id. at 1469-70.
129. Id. at 1470.
130. Id. at 1460 n.13 (citations omitted).
131. Id. at 1470 (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 1465-68.
133. Id. at 1465-66 (quoting Headquarters Agreement, supra note 8, § 11).
134. Id. at 1466.
135. Id. at 1465-67.
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its obligations to United Nations Observer Missions.' 3 8 Thus, the court
concluded that in view of the purpose of the Headquarters Agreement
and the United States' prior acquiescence, the United States was obli-
gated under the Headquarters Agreement to provide access to the
PLO. 139
The court determined that although Congress implemented the
ATA in order to close the PLO offices in the United States, including the
PLO Observer Mission, it did not clearly intend to do so if it meant the
United States would be in violation of its international obligations."40
This congressional ambiguity coupled with the ATA's ambiguous lan-
guage buttressed the court's decision that the ATA did not apply to the
Headquarters Agreement. 14 1
Underlying the court's decision was the last in time rule. If Con-
gress explicitly referred to the PLO Observer Mission and explicitly di-
rected a violation of the Headquarters Agreement, the court would
either have had to close the mission or abandon the last in time rule.
E. Analysis of the U.S. v. PLO Decision
The controversy over the PLO Observer Mission produced two dis-
concerting misinterpretations of international law. First, President Rea-
gan either underestimated or minimalized the complexity of the
controversy. When he signed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act
of 1988-89, he rationalized his fear of the ATA encroaching executive
authority by stating that the United States had not violated international
law because it continued to refuse to recognize the PLO as a sover-
eign.14 2 This simple analysis obfuscated the real issue. The controversy
was not about United States obligations to the PLO, but about United
States obligations to the United Nations and its member states.
The second misinterpretation of international law was on the part
of Congress. The congressional response to warnings by the State De-
partment and the United Nations that the ATA violated the Headquar-
ters Agreement was inadequate and remarkably unsophisticated.
Congress did not consider completely the international ramifications of
the bill. Not even one committee hearing was held to discuss the is-
sues. 1 4 3 Moreover, Congress relied on an extremely weak construction
of the Headquarters Agreement for support of its argument that the clo-
sure of the PLO Observer Mission would not violate any international
obligations. 144 The court stated that there was no doubt that the Head-
138. Id. at 1466-67.
139. Id. at 1468.
140. Id. at 1468-69.
141. Id. at 1470.
142. President's Statement on Signing H.R. 1777 Into Law, 23 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1548 (Dec. 22, 1987).
143. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1460.
144. Congress did not, as the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties
1282 [Vol. 34: p. 1265
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quarters Agreement imposed an obligation upon the United States to
refrain from impairing the functioning of the PLO Observer Mission.1 4 5
The only issue on which Congress remained consistent was its condem-
nation of terrorism. 146 It can be inferred that Congress was more con-
cerned with taking a tough stance against terrorism than in weighing
sensitive aspects of international law. It is submitted that Congress
sought to violate the spirit of the Headquarters Agreement without hav-
ing to expressly overrule it.
Considering the detrimental international consequences of a viola-
tion of the Headquarters Agreement, the court strained to find some
legal basis in which it could refuse to order the PLO to close its United
Nations Observer Mission. The legislative ambiguity surrounding the
ATA allowed the court to invoke the principle that "an act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the laws of nations if any other
possible construction remains." 147 The disconcerting aspect of the U.S.
v. PLO decision, however, is that the last in time rule remains viable,
although inconsistent with an international community which relies
heavily on supranational obligations.
The PLO Observer Mission controversy exemplifies the danger of
absolute adherence to the last in time rule. Given the stated goal of
some of the framers of the ATA to close the mission and the Act's rather
specific language, there is a tenable argument that Congress intended
the ATA to apply to the PLO Observer Mission in New York. Moreover,
considering Congress' recent bold assertion of previously dormant leg-
islative power, it was quite possible for Congress to have directly and
unequivocally drafted legislation for the specific purpose of closing the
PLO Observer Mission notwithstanding any contrary law or treaty. Such
a direct violation of the Headquarters Agreement would seriously un-
dermine and jeopardize the functioning of the United Nations. The
court's decision, while accomplishing its principal objective of keeping
the PLO Observer Mission in operation, merely postponed the necessity
to reexamine the validity of the last in time rule.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE LAST IN TIME RULE
A. Introduction
This section will examine the constitutional underpinnings of the
last in time rule. In the Head Money Cases, Whitney, and the Chinese Exclu-
sion Case, the Supreme Court relied on the supremacy clause to conclude
that because treaties and statutes are lexically equal, later enacted stat-
requires, interpret the Headquarters Agreement in context and in view of its
objectives. See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 340.
145. U.S. v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1471.
146. Id. at 1470.
147. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804).
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utes take precedence over treaties. 1 48 The supremacy clause, however,
does not expressly address the relative status of treaties and statutes. It
simply states that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme Law of the Land." 14 9
As one noted commentator has pointed out, the supremacy clause
was not designed with the issue of the relative status of treaties and stat-
utes in mind.150 Rather, its purpose was to establish the concept of fed-
eral sovereignty over states. 15 1 The Supreme Court's assertion that
statutes and treaties have lexical equality is without textual support. To
analogize, if B and C are each greater than D, it does not necessarily
follow that B is equal to C.
15 2
By the very terms of the supremacy clause the three sources of fed-
eral law, although all "supreme" to state law, do not carry equal weight
since statutes must be enacted "in Pursuance" of the Constitution. 53
In Reid v. Covert, 15 4 Justice Black, in determining, whether treaties are
subject to the restrictions of the Constitution, concluded that "no agree-
ment with a foreign nation can confer power on the Congress, or on any
other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution."' 15 5 Yet, the absence of a qualifying phrase stating that
treaties must also be enacted in pursuance of the Constitution evinces
textual support for the proposition that treaties are weightier than stat-
utes. 15 6 Moreover, no treaty has ever been declared unconstitutional by
a federal court.1
5 7
The Supreme Court's determination that the supremacy clause pro-
vides that statutes and treaties are lexically equal was a broad interpreta-
tion with limited textual support. One explanation for this broad
interpretation is that during the late 1880s nationalism and legislative
authority were at a zenith.' 5 8 Hence it is not surprising that the
Supreme Court in the Head Money Cases based the last in time rule on the
148. For a discussion of the last in time rule, see supra notes 24-39 and
accompanying text.
149. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
150. L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 163.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2.
154. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
155. Id. at 16-17.
156. This proposition was raised by Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (Migratory Bird Treaty with Great Britain did not en-
croach upon state rights under tenth amendment). The Supreme Court rejected
the proposition in Reid. Reid, 354 U.S. at 16-17.
157. K. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 304 (1967) (citations
omitted).
158. Lobel, supra note 24, at 1110-11.
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assertion that nothing "in its essential character, or in the branches of
the government by which the treaty is made, . . . gives it . . . superior
sanctity." 159 This blanket assertion, however, needs to be carefully
scrutinized in light of recent constitutional developments in the separa-
tion of powers area.
B. Constitutional Procedure
The last in time rule creates inconsistencies with basic constitu-
tional principles. First, as mentioned above, the textual foundation of
the rule, the supremacy clause, does not support the rule. Second, the
last in time rule may well be incongruous with explicit constitutional
procedures mandating that only the President and Senate participate in
treaty making, and requiring that Congress present all bills to the Presi-
dent for his signature.
An essential element of treaties ignored by the last in time rule is
the primary role of the Executive in the treaty-making process with only
the Senate providing a legislative check. The Constitution authorizes
the President "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to
make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.' 60
In the Head Money Cases, the Supreme Court contended that the ex-
clusion of the House of Representatives from the treaty-making process
did not strengthen treaties, but rather implied a greater deference to
laws in which both houses of Congress participated. 161 Careful consid-
eration of the treaty-making procedure in light of modern constitutional
developments indicates, however, that this conclusion is unsound.
Only in four instances does the Constitution expressly and without
reservation delegate powers to a single branch of Congress. The House
of Representatives has the exclusive power to initiate impeachment pro-
ceedings, 162 and only the Senate is empowered to try and convict on
impeachment charges, 16 3 to confirm or reject presidential appoint-
ments1 64 and to approve treaties.' 6 5
A significant aspect of these unicameral powers, which is a source of
their strength and importance, is that they are not subject to presidential
veto. The impeachment powers demonstrate the essential distinction
between unicameral powers and bicameral powers. The separate role
each branch of Congress plays in the impeachment process maximizes
the gravity of impeachment and indicates the framers' intent to prevent
159. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599.
160. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
161. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 599.
162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
163. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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a monopolization of power by any of the branches. 166
Similarly, the treaty approval and presidential appointment confir-
mation procedures are extremely important to national interests, and
both procedures act as a check on the power of the Executive. Treaties
establish relationships between the United States and other nations.
Presidential appointments are vital to the working of the national gov-
ernment and essential to the implementation of executive policies. The
constitutional delegation to the Senate of a role in these procedures can
be construed as a necessary reduction of legislative authority. The exclu-
sion of the House streamlines the process and insures swift and effective
decisions.
Although the Constitution expressly provides that the President
may make a treaty with the advice and consent of the Senate, it is unclear
what procedure is necessary for a treaty to be terminated or violated. 16 7
Under the last in time rule, both houses of Congress participate in treaty
termination. In order to determine whether this violates constitutional
procedure, it is useful, by way of close analogy, to catalog the ways that
treaties can come to an end.
First, the President can terminate a treaty unilaterally, either in its
embryonic stage or after it becomes law. The President alone can imple-
ment a treaty with another nation. Once a treaty is approved by the
Senate, the President has autonomy regarding how to proceed. He can
ratify it or he can ignore it. 16 8 Thus, if the executive branch makes a
treaty, and the Senate approves by a two-thirds vote, the President can
derail the implementation of the treaty by simply doing nothing.
It has also been established that the President can act unilaterally to
terminate an existing treaty. Some legal theorists contend that because
the Senate has an advice and consent role in the making of a treaty, its
consent should also be required for the termination of a treaty. 16 9 The
more convincing argument, however, is that the President may have to
assert his international authority expeditiously, and should not be bur-
dened by a requirement that he submit a treaty termination proposal to
the Senate for approval. This is buttressed by the fact that the Senate
has never established any conclusive treaty-terminating power. 170
166. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 202-04 (1985) (noting that judiciary cannot act to stop
impeachment).
167. L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 129. Professor Henkin notes that the fram-
ers were eager to remove the treaty-making power from Congress, which had
complete treaty-making authority under the Articles of Confederation. The re-
sult was disorder and a lack of compliance by the states. Id.
168. Id. at 136.
169. Id. at 169 & 417 n.133 (citing Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the
President in International Relations, 25 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 658-65 (1937); Riggs,
Termination of Treaties by the Executive Without Congressional Approval, 32 J. AIR L. &
COMM. 526, 533-34 (1966)).
170. L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 169.
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Moreover, while the Senate is mandated constitutionally to give advice
and consent on the confirmation of presidential appointees, the
Supreme Court has un quivocally determined that the Senate has no
authority regarding the removal of such executive officers.171 Similarly,
once a treaty is ratified the Senate's role should be considered essen-
tially completed.
The executive authority to unilaterally terminate a treaty was re-
cently exerted by President Carter when, in an effort to normalize rela-
tions with the People's 1.epublic of China, he unilaterally terminated the
United States' mutual cefense treaty with Taiwan.' 7 2 In addressing a
challenge to the President's action, the Supreme Court, in Goldwater v.
Carter,' 73 refused to rule that the President must share treaty-termina-
tion authority with the Senate.
In Goldwater, the Court rejected Senator Goldwater's contention
that the President had e:.ceeded his constitutional authority by unilater-
ally terminating the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. Senator Gold-
water's reasoning was that because it took two-thirds of the Senate to
approve a treaty, it shotld take two-thirds to terminate one as well. 1 7 4
The Supreme Court's decision was divided in large measure because
Congress as a legislativ body had not challenged the President's con-
duct. 175 FourJustices held that the issue was a nonjusticiable political
question. 176 Justice Povell held that the issue was not ripe for resolu-
tion because Congress had not challenged the President. 177 Only Jus-
tice Brennan addressed the merits, and he stated that he would not
question the executive decision because it rested on the power of the
President to recognize foreign governments. 178
The other way that i treaty can be rendered ineffective is by stat-
ute-i.e., the last in time rule. The rule is constitutionally unsound be-
cause it allows Congress io pass a law which abrogates a treaty. The last
in time rule transforms the violation of treaties from an executive to a
legislative function. Whereas treaties are initiated by the President, the
last in time rule allows both houses of Congress to initiate the violation
of a treaty. Moreover, it z lso allows the House of Representatives, which
171. Meyers v. United .;tates, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). ChiefJustice Taft, writ-
ing for the Court, held that Congress can not restrict the President's power to
remove executive officers. 11. at 176.
172. Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Republic of China, Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
173. 444 U.S. 996 (197D).
174. Scheffer, The Law ,,/ Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-
Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 931, 937 n.18 (citations
omitted).
175. See L. FISHER, supro note 166, at 270-72.
176. Goldwater, 444 U.S at 1002-06 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, CJ.,
Stewart and Stevens, J.J., co:icurring in judgment).
177. Id. at 997-98 (Pow 1l, J., concurring in judgment).
178. Id. at 1006 (Brenn in, J., dissenting).
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is given no constitutional role in the treaty-making process, a significant
role in the decision-making process concerning whether or not the
United States should violate its treaty obligations.' 7 9
For example, in the case of a statute advocating the violation of a
treaty, each house of Congress needs only a simple majority to send the
bill to the President. If the President vetoes the bill both houses can
override his veto by a two-thirds vote. The Senate's role in passing such
legislation is highly questionable because the Senate has never been
given authority to terminate a treaty against the will of the President. 180
The House of Representatives' role is more suspect because it is not
even authorized to participate in the making, let alone the termination,
of a treaty.' 8'
The above contradiction is analogous to the legislative veto contro-
versy which was resolved in the landmark case of Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service v. Chadha.' 8 2 In that case, Congress had delegated to the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) the authority to suspend
deportation of illegal aliens, subject to veto by either the Senate or the
House of Representatives. 18 3 The Supreme Court held this one-house
legislative veto unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated the legis-
lature's bicamerality requirement.' 84 The Supreme Court stated that
neither the House nor Senate could act independently absent express
constitutional authority. 185
The Court discussed the explicit unicameral powers and asserted
that they were not within the ambit of legislative functions, but rather
were "important and binding one-House acts provided for in the Con-
stitution."' 8 6 The Court also stated that the unicameral exceptions
"provide further support for the conclusion that congressional authority
is not to be implied."' 8 7 Similarly, where the Constitution provides for
unicamerality the Congress should not be able to act bicamerally. For
instance, there is no question that the House of Representatives may not
179. See L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 164.
180. For a discussion of the process of terminating a treaty, see supra notes
167-79 and accompanying text.
181. When the terms of the treaty manifest the intention that the treaty
shall become effective in domestic law without enabling legislation, the treaty is
self-executing and the House has no role at all. K. HOLLOWAY, supra note 157, at
306. The House exerts minimal authority concerning treaties only when it, as
well as the Senate, is required to pass implementing legislation which validifies
non-self-executing treaties into domestic law. Id. at 306-07. This authority does
not affect the United States' international obligations as created by the treaty.
Evans, Self-Executing Treaties in the United States of America, 1953 BRIT Y.B. OF INT'L
L. 178.
182. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
183. Id. at 923.
184. Id. at 948-59.
185. Id. at 956-57.
186. Id. at 956.
187. Id.
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assert any authority in t'ie appointment procedure for any executive ap-
pointees. Admittedly, the Constitution provides no similar unambigu-
ous guidance concerning the termination or violation of treaties. It is
clear, however, by the text of the Constitution, that only the Senate has a
role in the treaty-making process, and that the Senate's authority is cur-
tailed once it approves I treaty.
Therefore, while only the President and the Senate have roles in the
making of treaties, the te rmination of treaties falls within the Executive's
powers alone. No authority has ever given the Senate a role in the ter-
mination of treaty proc ss. The House has no role at all in the making
of treaties, and it should have no role in the termination of treaties. The
inclusion of Congress, F articularly the House of Representatives, in the
treaty-violation process, as allowed by the last in time rule, may well be
an assertion of implied congressional authority that is constitutionally
impermissible.
C. Presentment
The Supreme Cour in Chadha also emphasized that the legislative
veto was unconstitutionz I because it violated the presentment clause,' 88
which requires a legislative act to be presented to the President for ap-
proval or veto.' 89 The Supreme Court noted that the purpose of a pres-
idential veto was to "car fully circumscribe" the powers of Congress. 190
The application of the last in time rule may deprive the President of
his veto power as mandated by the presentment clause. If Congress
adds a treaty-violation p -ovision as a rider amendment to an important
appropriations bill, the President is in essence forced to sign the bill.
Otherwise, necessary fur ds for the operation of the government, which
are appropriated at Con ,ress' discretion, could be withheld. 19 1
The procedural mainer in which Congress passed the ATA is an
example of the questionable use of rider amendments. The ATA was
enacted as a rider amendment to The Foreign Relations Act of 1987,192
which appropriated esseintial funds for the State Department' 93 and the
United Nations.194 The NTA was tacked on as a rider amendment even
though it was unrelated to the other provisions of the Foreign Relations
Act.195 Moreover, the A'FA was enacted against the advice of the execu-
188. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
189. Chada, 462 U.S. a. 945.
190. Id. at 947.
191. See L. HENKIN, su/ ra note 2, at 79.
192. Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1988-89, Pub. L. No. 100-204,
§§ 1001-1005, 101 Stat. 1331, 1406-07 (1987) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-
5203 (Supp. V 1987)).
193. Id. § 101(a), 101 Stat. at 1335-50.
194. Id. § 102(a)(l), 1(1 Stat. at 1336.
195. For support of thd view that the President should be able to veto non-
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tive branch. 196 Obscuring it in a necessary appropriations bill effec-
tively denied the President his veto power and may have been a violation
of the presentment clause.
The practice of using a rider amendment to abrogate treaties
should be carefully scrutinized. The constitutional foundation for the
last in time rule is already unsound. When a rider amendment is used to
force the President to sign a statute which abrogates a treaty, the consti-
tutional problems with the last in time rule are compounded. A rider
amendment which violates treaty obligations, particularly supranational
obligations, is quite possibly an impermissible legislative infringement
on the executive function as the diplomatic representative of the nation.
Congress is not only taking the initiative in the treaty-violating process,
it is also greatly reducing the President's ability to participate in the pro-
cess at all.
D. Executive Authority in Foreign Affairs
Another flaw in the last in time rule is that it represents an en-
croachment by Congress on the President's power to conduct foreign
affairs. Although the Constitution does not delineate clearly all of the
specific foreign affairs powers, the Executive was intended to be the pri-
mary force in this area, particularly in the area of diplomacy. 197 The last
in time rule allows Congress to usurp the President's legitimate consti-
tutional authority in the foreign affairs sphere. The delineation of for-
eign affairs powers in the Constitution was purposely left ambiguous in
order for the political branches to gradually develop their powers. 198
Some foreign affairs powers, however, were clearly left under the con-
trol of the Executive. For instance, the treaty-making power was explic-
itly delegated as an executive function.' 9 9 Also, the Constitution
provides that the President "shall receive Ambassadors and other public
Ministers."'20 0 The President is also empowered to appoint ambassa-
dors, public ministers and consuls with the advice and consent of the
Senate,2 0 1 and is designated the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.20 2 Moreover, the Constitution gives the President exclusive
power to recognize or not recognize a foreign entity.20 3
germane riders, see Givens, The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermane Riders to
Legislation, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 60 (1965).
196. For a discussion of executive opposition to the ATA, see supra notes
93-97 and accompanying text.
197. L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 33-35. The framers were dissatisfied with
"multiheaded diplomacy." Id. at 33.
198. Id. at 34.
199. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
200. Id. art. II, § 3.
201. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
202. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
203. Id. art. II, § 3.
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The enumerated powers do not exhaust the President's powers in
foreign affairs. Although Congress plays a role in foreign affairs, the
President has unquestionably evolved into the primary foreign policy
maker. 20 4 The landmark case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.205 established that the President is the "sole organ of the federal
government in the field of international relations."'20 6 The basis for this
decision is that the complex and delicate nature of foreign affairs re-
quires quick and single-minded decisions.2 0 7 The Supreme Court speci-
fied that while the President makes treaties with the advice and consent
of the Senate, "[the President] alone negotiates. 20 8
While Curtiss-Wright and its progeny20 9 established the Executive's
supremacy in foreign affairs, it is unquestioned that Congress has cer-
tain powers in the foreign policy area. Congress has the power to ap-
propriate funds.2 1 0 It may use this power to exert influence on foreign
affairs by limiting appropriations.2 1' In addition, Congress has main-
tained that some of the enumerated powers in article I of the Constitu-
tion, 2 12 as well as some implied constitutional authority, give it the right
to influence foreign affairs. 213 Recently, Congress has challenged exec-
utive control of foreign affairs with the War Powers Resolution, 2 14
which restricts executive deployment of United States armed forces, and
the Boland Amendment, 2 15 which prohibited the use of funds by the
204. L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 37-38. Congress has generally been unable
to usurp executive authority regarding foreign affairs. Id. at 38.
205. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). The defendants challenged a presidential em-
bargo prohibiting the selling of arms to countries involved in the South America
Chaco controversy, claiming that the President had overstepped his constitu-
tional authority. Id.
206. Id. at 320 (quoting Marshall, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
207. Id. at 319. The element of secrecy is also necessary for conducting
foreign affairs. Id. (citation omitted).
208. Id.
209. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942) (Court elevated
status of executive agreements to that of treaties); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324, 330 (1937) (Court affirmed President's power to recognize foreign
governments and to make executive agreements without advice and consent of
Senate).
210. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
211. See L. HENKIN, supra note 2, at 79.
212. Congress is granted the power to regulate foreign commerce, to de-
clare war, provide for the common defense, define and punish piracies and felo-
nies committed on the high seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
213. Congress has maintained that the necessary and proper clause of arti-
cle I, § 8 of the Constitution gives it implied authority to influence foreign af-
fairs. SeeJ. NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 194-95 (3d
ed. 1986).
214. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (adopted over presidential
veto on Nov. 7, 1973).
215. Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub, L. No. 97-377,
§ 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982). But cf Riesenfeld, The Powers of Congress and the Presi-
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CIA or Department of Defense to provide support for military activities
to the Nicaraguan Contras.
Despite congressional inroads in the President's foreign affairs pow-
ers, one area where the executive branch maintains complete control is
diplomacy.2 16 The unambiguous constitutional delegations of power
demonstrate that the President is designated to be completely in control
of United States diplomacy. 2 17
The last in time rule allows Congress to interfere with the diplo-
matic authority of the President. The distinction between the essential
natures of bilateral and supranational multilateral treaties is critical in
this analysis. Since bilateral treaties often control commercial agree-
ments, Congress arguably should have authority to pass legislation
which abrogates them because the Constitution expressly provides Con-
gress with the authority to regulate foreign commerce. 2 18
Multilateral treaties which impose supranational obligations, on the
other hand, are essentially diplomatic instruments. They provide guide-
lines and rules for the member states to follow in order to assure greater
world peace and security.2 19 Even though such multilateral treaties may
have commercial elements, they serve primarily a diplomatic function,
because a breach could significantly affect relations among nations. 220
In Hampton & Co. v. United States,2 2 ' ChiefJustice Taft stated that "it
is a breach of the National fundamental law if Congress ... attempts to
invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial
power." 222 Thus, a statute which purports to take authority originally
vested in the President and give it to the legislature should be carefully
analyzed. A statute which purports to violate a treaty, especially one
enacted against the President's will, should receive the closest scrutiny
because it infringes upon the President's authority in the critical area of
foreign affairs.
dent in International Relations: Revisited, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 409 (1987) (ques-
tioning whether Boland Amendment is undue congressional influence on
Executive's right to conduct foreign affairs).
216. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 53-54, U.S. v. PLO (No. 88-Civ.-1962) ("Polit-
ical recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive") (quoting Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964)); see also United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1942) (same); Americans United for Separations of
Church & State v. Reagan, 786 F.2d 194, 202 (3d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 914 (1986).
217. For a further discussion of the President's control over United States
diplomacy, see supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
218. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
219. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1, which provides in part: "[I]ts
Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the mainte-
nance of international peace and security." Id.
220. For a discussion of the effect of the last in time rule on multilateral
obligations, see supra notes 40-88 and accompanying text.
221. 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
222. Id. at 406.
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Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
yer,2 23 which determined the limits on executive power, is useful in dem-
onstrating that the last in time rule allows the legislature to encroach on
the President's foreign affairs powers. In the third of his categorizations
of executive power, Justice Jackson stated that "when the President
takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Con-
gress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his
own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter." 2 24
Concerning multilateral treaties which impose supranational obliga-
tions, the converse of Justice Jackson's analysis is that for Congress to
pass a law violating United States treaty obligations it must rely on its
own constitutional authority minus the constitutional authority of the
President. In a situation where Congress passes a law over the objection
or veto of the President, its power is undoubtably at its lowest ebb be-
cause the Constitution does not provide, and the Supreme Court has
never recognized, congressional control over diplomatic functions.
Rather, the Constitution explicitly empowers the President to handle the
diplomatic concerns of the nation.2 25 Rigid adherence to the last in
time rule would allow Congress to interfere with the President's exclu-
sive control of diplomatic affairs and would constitute a violation of the
separation of powers principle.
VI. CONCLUSION
The last in time rule allows Congress to take the initiative in the
treaty-violation process and to interfere with foreign diplomacy, an area
specifically delegated to the control of the President. Even at its incep-
tion, the rule was fundamentally unsound because the Supreme Court
during the late nineteenth century misconstrued the meaning and pur-
pose of the supremacy clause. Moreover, the rapid development of the
international community, particularly the widespread movement toward
increased global interdependence and cooperation, has created a com-
pelling need for the United States to repel or at least modify the last in
time rule. The recent creation of multilateral treaties which impose su-
pranational obligations empowers the international organizations which
evolve from such treaties with unprecedented legal authority. The
supranationality of such organizations, including to a limited extent the
United Nations, gives these organizations legislative authority and man-
dates that a member state defer to particular treaty provisions or organi-
zational decisions even if in conflict with the member state's domestic
law. The last in time rule contradicts the international responsibilities
223. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
224. Id. at 637 Jackson, J., concurring).
225. For a discussion of executive authority in the diplomatic relations area,
see supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
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that the United States has voluntarily undertaken by ratifying the United
Nations Charter and will hinder the United States' ability to negotiate
future supranational agreements.
Indeed, the continuing controversy over the PLO Observer Mission
aptly demonstrates that the United States' present policy, consistent
with the last in time rule, is to disregard the United States' international
obligations under the United Nations Charter by threatening the United
Nations whenever its members or organizations act contrary to United
States objectives. In November 1989, the United States, despite binding
financial obligations under Article 17 of the United Nations Charter,
threatened to cut off financing to the United Nations after the PLO cir-
culated two draft resolutions calling for an upgrading of its observer
mission status. 2 26 Nevertheless, despite this threat, the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization took a step toward recognizing the
PLO as the official representative of Palestine by voting overwhelmingly
to strengthen economic cooperation with the PLO. 2 2 7 Apparently, the
United States' threats to interfere with the operations of the United Na-
tions are losing force, particularly because the United States currently
owes the United Nations $430 million in regular dues and $152 million
for peacekeeping operations. 228
The last in time rule is at the root of the United States'policy to
inconsistently honor its international obligations. The result of such a
policy is a decrease in international influence and respect, as manifested
by the United States' failure to establish an effective agenda in the
United Nations. By consistently threatening the United Nations with
sanctions and withdrawal, the United States can succeed only in either
destroying the viability of the United Nations, or in forcing the United
Nations to function crippled, without the support of its greatest financial
benefactor. Neither result is in the United States' best interests. The
United States would be better able to achieve its political objectives by
demonstrating that it is willing to work for greater international peace
and prosperity through cooperative diplomatic channels. A repeal or
modification of the last in time rule, at least with respect to multilateral
treaties which impose supranational obligations, would be an effective
first step toward that end.
Kevin T. Mulhearn
226. Lewis, U.S. Threatens to Halt U.N. Payments, N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1989,
at A3, cols. 1-2. The resolutions recognize the existence of a Palestine state and
would make the PLO its representative. Id.
227. Lewis, U.N. Group Backs a P.L.O. Role, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1989, at
A8, col. 3. At a meeting of the organization's general conference, 96 countries
voted in favor of a resolution authorizing the agency "to assist agricultural de-
velopment 'in close cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization.' "
Id. Fourteen countries abstained, and only the United States and Israel voted
against the resolution. Id.
228. Id. at A8, cols. 3-4.
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